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Wenming Xu, Stefan E. Weishaar and  
Niels Philipsen
1.  REGULATORY REFORM IN CHINA AND  
THE EU
China has achieved spectacular economic achievements since the 1990s 
with a GDP growth rate of around 10 per cent per year on average. It 
has rapidly changed from an agricultural to an industrialized country. 
A strategy of incremental reform has been adopted, rather than the 
‘shock therapy’ applied by former Eastern European socialist economies. 
To stimulate incentives for regional executives, China has enforced a 
 ‘regionally decentralized authoritarian regime’, which combines the politi-
cal centralization of political appointment and promotion structures, and 
economic decentralization, whereby regional governments are deeply 
involved in economic development within their own jurisdiction.1
Consequently, both central and regional governments have maintained 
significant influence during the development and reform process. Public 
fixed investments and exports have always been two important engines 
leading economic growth at the expense of domestic consumption. To 
fuel the economic success, factor prices of, for example, land, labour and 
capital have been (and still are) distorted and repressed.2 In some cases, 
inefficient state-owned enterprises have enjoyed the low-cost inputs and 
resources that could have been channelled to more efficient private firms. 
According to many commentators, this model is unsustainable.3
This volume proposes to analyse Chinese regulation from a compara-
tive (mainly EU) and law and economics (‘regulatory state’ and economics 
of regulation) perspective to set out a reform agenda in selected legal areas 
including financial, administrative and environmental law and regulation 
 1 Xu (2011), 1078. In the literature this is also referred to as ‘governance 
structures’.
 2 Xu (2014), 141–68.
 3 Cull and Xu (2003).
WEISHAAR_9781785368530_t.indd   1 26/07/2017   10:03
Wenming Xu, Stefan E. Weishaar and Niels Philipsen - 9781785368547
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 04/30/2020 03:46:48PM
via free access
2 Regulatory reform in China and the EU
of contracts. This is particularly important considering that the Chinese 
government recently launched a national project to comprehensively 
deepen its regulatory reform that only sets out general principles.4 Many 
details of the reform plan need to be fleshed out, and the EU and US 
experience is likely to contribute to this process.
We will continue this introductory chapter by first providing a short 
overview of the relevant economic literature on the regulatory state and 
economics of regulation (section  2). After that, we will introduce the 
structure of the book (section 3), its origins (section 4) and contributors 
(section 5).
2. A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
This section provides a brief introduction to the literature on the regulatory 
state and economics of regulation and is not meant to be all- encompassing.5 
It is the object and purpose of this section to present the relevant  conceptual 
framework that is employed in later chapters of this book.
The concept of the ‘regulatory state’ is used inter alia by Shleifer, who 
notes that different governance models can be chosen and ranked accord-
ing to the degree of public involvement in the governance structures for 
attaining a multitude of objectives including the minimization of social 
harm from market activities.6 Such models include ‘laissez-faire’ govern-
ment, regulatory interventions by the state (the ‘regulatory state’) and 
(complete) state ownership. The laissez-faire government does very little 
besides offering an essential legal framework, and relies largely on private 
enforcement action (litigation) to solve conflicts. The regulatory state is 
characterized by independent regulatory agencies overseeing specific areas 
of the economy, ex ante designing of regulatory rules, and ex post public 
enforcement by public agencies and private enforcement via litigation. 
Not surprisingly, the concept of complete state ownership is characterized 
by full state control of industries.
 4 See Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform 
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda 
Wenti de Jueding, adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, 12 November 2013) (PRC).
 5 See Deller and Vantaggiato (2015) for a comprehensive survey of the legal 
and economic literature. It should be noticed that there is also an extensive politi-
cal science literature on the regulatory state: see Majone (1994).
 6 Schleifer (2005).
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Each of these governance models has its own comparative advantages 
in controlling society; the specific conditions in a given country are crucial 
determinants of the optimal strategies for social control of business.7 For 
example, in a country with a highly efficient court system, the laissez-
faire model, relying solely on private litigation, would generate the most 
efficient outcome.8 However, both the American and European societies 
today are more regulated than before.9 From an efficiency perspective, 
there are three potential justifications for the increasing reliance on 
regulations. First, regulators are specialized; second, regulators as central 
representatives could overcome free-rider problems; third, the ex ante 
regulatory rules could reduce the costs of identification of violations.10
These notions of the role of the regulatory state by Shleifer and his 
many co-authors are in line with the so-called ‘public interest’ theory of 
regulation. This theory puts forward market failure as the only (potential) 
justification for regulatory intervention when the goal of the legislator is 
to maximize efficiency.11 Information asymmetry, market power, exter-
nalities and free-rider problems are the main causes of market failure that 
are discussed in the law and economics literature.12 The term ‘regulatory 
state’ has also been used by others, including Susan Rose-Ackerman. In 
her book Rethinking the Progressive Agenda (1992), she discusses the pos-
sibilities of a progressive public agenda that combines active government 
and market competition.
However, the regulatory capture theories warn that government regula-
tions run the risk of being sought by private interest groups in order to 
increase their own benefits.13 The starting point of these theories, which 
are based on empirical findings from the United States, is that there is 
a market (supply and demand) for regulation, just as for other types of 
goods and services. Politicians, maximizing their own utility in terms 
of number of votes, size of bureaucracy or power, for example, may be 
tempted to respond to requests for regulatory favours from special interest 
 7 Djankov et al. (2003).
 8 Glaeser and Shleifer (2003).
 9 Shleifer (2005). A growing literature also identifies China as a regulatory 
state: see Du et al. (2009).
10 Glaeser and Shleifer (2003).
11 Of course, public interest theory recognizes that there are many other policy 
goals besides efficiency, such as income distribution, fairness, non-discrimination, 
preventing climate change, and so on. On the discussion of different policy goals, 
see the chapter by Philipsen in this volume.
12 For a more elaborate discussion see e.g. Ogus (1994), Philipsen (2009) and 
Cooter and Ulen (2012), 38–42.
13 See Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), Becker (1983).
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groups that do not (necessarily) correspond to the public interest. Whether 
such interest groups are successful, according to Olson, will depend on 
both the transaction costs of organizing as an interest group and on infor-
mation asymmetries between the ‘insiders’ and the public at large.14 In the 
law and economics literature, this view on regulation has also been termed 
the ‘private interest’ approach to regulation.15 There is obviously a strong 
overlap with the ‘public choice’ literature, in which topics such as corrup-
tion, voting behaviour and political decision-making are discussed by the 
likes of Buchanan, Tullock, Mueller and others.16
Sunstein argues that a centralized review of agency rule-making is nec-
essary to minimize the adverse effect of rent-seeking behaviour.17 It can be 
seen that cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and regulatory impact assessments 
are among the most popular instruments governing the process of rule-
making. They are employed to control and monitor subordinate public 
agencies because they reduce the asymmetry of information between the 
principals and these agencies.18
In addition to the process of rule-making, it is crucial for the regulatory 
state to also have an enforcement strategy that transfers ‘black letter law’ 
to de facto deterrence.19 Both public and private enforcement strategies 
have their comparative advantages. Public enforcement relies on public 
agencies, which have limited resources for enforcing the law.20 Civil serv-
ants generally lack appropriate incentives and tend to shirk their responsi-
bilities, which may result in an undersupply of law enforcement. However, 
public enforcement benefits from economies of scale and could overcome 
the collective action problem (‘rational apathy’), which can be a major 
problem in discouraging private enforcement.21
In contrast, private enforcement relies on private parties, which usually 
enforce the rules through civil litigations. The law and economics analysis 
of private enforcement of law dates back to at least Becker and Stigler 
14 Olson (1965).
15 See again Ogus (1994), Philipsen (2009), and the sources quoted therein.
16 For references, see e.g. Boehm (2007) and Philipsen (2009).
17 Sunstein (1990).
18 Posner (2001).
19 The seminal paper of Becker (1968) argues that the expected cost of crimes, 
which is determined by the size of the sanction and the enforcement intensity 
(probability of detection), determines criminals’ choices. Building on his work, 
scholars have pointed out that the enforcement intensity also depends on the prob-
ability of being prosecuted and convicted. See Faure et al. (2009).
20 See the survey article by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) on the literature of 
public enforcement.
21 On rational apathy, see Schäfer (2000). See also Faure and Philipsen (2014).
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and Landes and Posner.22 Even if private parties have sufficient incentives 
to bring suits, private enforcement could lead to inefficient outcomes 
if the private and social payoffs are not identical. When the net social 
benefits of law enforcement are greater than the net private benefits, dis-
persed affected parties face severe problems in bringing collective actions, 
whereas if net private benefits are greater than net social benefits, private 
parties tend to bring frivolous suits.23
3. OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
After this introduction, which discusses the analytical framework and the 
relevant law and economics literature, subsequent chapters present case 
studies from diverse regulatory experiences in the EU and China, and 
assess these from a regulatory state/economics of regulation perspective. 
The concluding chapter reflects on the lessons learnt in those chapters.
The book has three parts addressing financial markets, social and 
administrative regulation and the environment. Each of these parts con-
sists of independent but related chapters. In the fourth and final part of 
this book, we provide conclusions, as well as an essay by Jonathan Klick 
on the empirical analysis of regulation, with a particular focus on field 
experiments in China.
Part 1 consists of four chapters on regulatory reform in financial 
markets. The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the reform in the 
banking sector, which is the major source of financing for undertakings. 
The saving and borrowing rates in China are regulated and repressed in 
order to direct cheap credits to the state sector, but private enterprises 
have difficulty in obtaining loans from the banking system and are hence 
driven to the informal financing market. Tao Xi analyses the commercial 
banking system from the perspective of asymmetric information and pro-
poses a new framework for reforming the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Commercial Banks.
The remaining three chapters in Part 1 address stock markets. Regulators 
scrutinize firms applying for public equities offerings, closely control the 
number of newly listed firms and monitor their conduct. This process 
thus merits close examination. The market is underdeveloped and com-
promised by securities fraud, such as misrepresentation, insider trading 
22 Becker and Stigler (1974); Landes and Posner (1975).
23 Shavell (1993) points out that private parties in possession of information 
about the identity of those culpable should enforce regulations privately.
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and market manipulation. Such practices harm the interests of investors 
significantly and undermine their confidence. A recent reform mandated 
deregulation of the stock markets and an increase in the proportion of 
direct financing to reduce leverages by domestic firms. Jiye Hu and Yang 
Chen use international panel data to show the importance of institutional 
investors in maintaining the development and stability of stock markets 
across China and OECD countries. In addition, it is widely accepted that 
enforcement of securities laws is crucial if the confidence of investors is 
to be restored. Tianshu Zhou and Wenjing Li collect cases and carry out 
an investigation of the insider trading rules in the stock market. Finally, 
Jiajia Dai, Shiting Feng and Wenming Xu provide an empirical analysis 
of the weakness of the private enforcement regime by addressing securities 
litigation.
Part 2 of this book addresses social and administrative regulation and 
contains two chapters. Qi Zhou analyses the potential benefits from col-
laborations between contract lawyers and law and economic scholars, and 
provides insights into improving contract law. Niels Philipsen critically 
assesses the changing goals of EU state aid policy, from market integra-
tion and equity to efficiency and fiscal discipline in the EU, and discusses 
the possibility of also including this type of control on local government 
spending in China’s Anti-Monopoly Law.
In Part 3, three chapters are devoted to the environmental problems 
in China. Because of an emphasis on economic growth, regulators in 
China have until recently to some extent overlooked the problem of 
environmental pollution. Industrial firms have been able to externalize 
many of their environmental costs and water, air and land pollution 
has increased dramatically. Michael Faure and Roy Partain discuss the 
regulatory strategies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions via offshore 
carbon capture and storage. Binwei Gui, Michael Faure and Guangdong 
Xu empirically estimate the environmental Kuznets curve, that is the 
relationship between environmental pollution and economic growth 
in China. Stefan Weishaar and Ruohong Chen discuss environmental 
standards as possible regulatory strategies for reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions in China and the EU under World Trade Organization 
rules.
In Part 4 Jonathan Klick sets a law and economics research agenda by 
outlining the challenges of empirical analysis and by underlining the great 
potential of field experiments, particularly in China. A conclusion by the 
editors highlights the main contributions of this book.
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4. ORIGINS OF THIS BOOK
This book originates from a long-standing cooperation between 
various Chinese and European institutions. The editors have worked 
together for a long time through collaboration between the School 
of Law and Economics (SLE) at the China University of Political 
Science and Law (CUPL) in Beijing, to which Wenming Xu is con-
nected, the Maastricht European Institute for Transnational Legal 
Research (METRO), where Niels Philipsen is Vice-Director, and the 
Department of Law and Economics at the University of Groningen, 
to which Stefan Weishaar is affiliated. Both Niels Philipsen and Stefan 
Weishaar are teaching or have taught courses at the China–EU School of 
Law (CESL) at CUPL. Moreover, Niels Philipsen was recently appointed 
Adjunct Professor of the School of Law and Economics at CUPL.
5. CONTRIBUTORS
The contributors to this book are from various universities in China, 
Europe and the United States. Many of the Chinese contributors, includ-
ing Binwei Gui, Jiye Hu, Wenjing Li, Guangdong Xu, Wenming Xu and 
Tianshu Zhou, are connected to the SLE of CUPL. Ruohong Chen is 
affiliated to the Beijing Foreign Studies University (Beiwai). Qi Zhou, 
one of the Chinese contributors, has resided abroad for many years. He is 
associated with the University of Leeds (UK).
The European contributors have either Belgian, Dutch and/or 
German nationalities and include Stefan Weishaar from the University 
of Groningen (the Netherlands) as well as Michael Faure and Niels 
Philipsen, who are both associated with Maastricht University and the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam (the Netherlands). Jonathan Klick is affil-
iated to the University of Pennsylvania (USA) and Erasmus University 
Rotterdam (the Netherlands). Roy Partain is affiliated to the University 
of Aberdeen (UK).
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